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SECTION 108 OF THE I.R.C. AND THE
INCLUSION OF TUFTS GAIN: A PROPOSAL
FOR REFORM
Abstract: The 1983 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Commissioner u Tufts
established the modern rule that requires a taxpayer to include the full
amount of a nonrecourse note in the amount realized on the disposition
of a property, notwithstanding the fair market value of the property. Al-
though not fully understood at the time, this holding has had a large im-
pact on the ability of a financially troubled debtor to defer cancellation of
indebtedness income under § 108 of the Internal Revenue Code. Pres-
ently, § 108 allows a borrower who is insolvent or in a title 11 bankruptcy
proceeding to defer the recognition of COD income, rather than recog-
nize it as a gain. Under Tufts, when a property is transferred with a fair-
market value below the nonrecourse debt used to purchase the assPt, the
taxpayer realizes a non-deferrable gain to the extent of the difference be-
tween the fair-market value of the property and the taxpayer's basis in the
property. This Note argues that the Internal Revenue Service's treatment
of nonrecourse debt and its application to § 108 is unworkable. By allow-
ing an insolvent taxpayer to defer COD income while not allowing an
identical taxpayer to defer gain from the discharge of indebtedness, the
Service has disregarded the statutory purpose of § 108 and has violated
the fundamental principles of equity and fairness in the administration of
our tax system.
INTRODUCTION
Between October 2007 and 2008, home prices in the United States
declined by a staggering 23.4% according to the twenty-city Case-Shiller
Home Price Index.' This marked twenty-seven consecutive months the
index posted a loss, and prices have now fallen back to March 2004 lev-
els. 2 The record number of foreclosures in 2007 and 2008 have been
Standard & Poor's Case-Schiller Home Price Index, Dec. 30, 2008, available at http://
www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/indices_csmahp/2,3,4,0,0
,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0.hant Les Christie, Home Prices Post Record 18% Drop, CNNMoNEv.com ,
Dec. 30, 2008, http://money.cnn ,com/2008/12/30/real_estate/October_Case_Shiller/?post
. version=2008123014 (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
2 See Christie, supra note 1.
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cited as a contributing factor to the decline in home prices. 3 In many of
the worst markets, the majority of real estate sales involve foreclosed
properties, which typically sell at a steep discount from the rest of the
market. 4
 With the level of foreclosures expected to increase in 2009,
prices are likely to fall even lower as additional vacant inventory is
added to an already overburdened market.°
Although the macroeconomic issues regarding the real estate crisis
have been well-documented, the tax implications of foreclosure com-
bined with rapidly declining home values are commonly overlooked,
despite the devastating effects they can have on individual taxpayers.°
Consider, for example, a taxpayer who borrowed $200,000 to purchase
an investment property with a fair-market value of $200,000. Several
years later, the combination of economic recession and crumbling real
estate values have led the taxpayer into financial ruin and she has de-
faulted on the loan. She still owes $150,000 of principal and interest on
the loan and her remaining basis in the property after depreciation is
$100,000. 7
 What are the tax consequences to the borrower if the bank
forecloses on the property in full satisfaction of the outstanding loan?
Although a conveyance is taxable as a sale regardless of whether it
is voluntary or involuntary, the Internal Revenue Service (the "Ser-
vice") applies different rules depending on whether the borrower is
personally liable for the debt and whether the loan balance exceeds the
value of the property at the time of foreclosure.° Suppose for the mo-
ment that the fair market value of the property is $160,000, or $10,000
above the outstanding loan balance. In this situation, the gain realized
from the sale or other disposition of property is the excess of the
3 Id. About 1.5 million foreclosures occurred in 2007, and an additional 1.2 million
occurred in the first half of 2008. Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy: Past Puzzles, Recent Reforms,
and the Mortgage Crisis, 14 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14549,
2008).
4 Christie, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 See Stephen P. Milner et al., Foreclosures, Private Sales and Deeds-in-Lieu in California:
Understanding and Planning for the Debtor's Tax Consequences, 22 CAL. BANKR. J. 161, 161
(1994).
7 A taxpayer's basis in property is the investment in that property for tax purposes and
is the maximum amount a taxpayer can receive in payment for an asset without realizing a
gain. DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY H. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A STUDENT'S GUIDE
TO 111E INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 31 (5th ed. 2005). The concept of basis is most fre-
quently used in determining the amount of gain or loss realized on the sale, exchange, or
other disposition of an asset. Id.
See Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307, 310 n.11 (1983); Milner, supra note 6, at 161.
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amount realized' over the taxpayer's adjusted basis. 9
 If upon foreclo-
sure, the bank receives the full value of the home (equal to $160,000)
in full satisfaction of the loan, the taxpayer would realize a gain of
$60,000.'° This result is the same whether the taxpayer is personally li-
able for the debt or not)
Now suppose that because the economy and real estate market
have weakened, the fair-market value of the property has plunged to
$110,000. Where the debtor is personally liable for the debt (recourse
debt), the Service bifurcates the transaction into part gain and part
cancellation of indebtedness ("COD"). 12
 The difference between the
fair-market value of the property and the taxpayer's basis is treated as
gain, while the difference between the outstanding amount of recourse
debt and the value of the property is treated as COD income." In this
example, the taxpayer realizes a gain of $10,000 and COD income of
$40,000 upon foreclosure."
Generally, however, § 108 of the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code") allows a borrower who is insolvent or in a tide 11 bankruptcy
proceeding to defer the recognition of COD income." Thus, an insol-
vent taxpayer in this example would face a current tax liability only to
9
 KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 595. The Service treats a foreclosure as a sale or other
disposition of property. See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 509, 510-11 (1941). The
amount realized from a sale or other disposition of property is the sum of the money re-
ceived plus the fair market value of any property (other than money) received. 1.R.C.
§ 1001(b) (2006); KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 600.
to See I.R.C. § 1001(a); Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1947); see also KAHN &
KAHN, supra note 7, at 595, 600. In the absence of clear and convincing proof to the con-
trary, the fair market value of the collateral will be the amount bid in the foreclosure pro-
ceeding. See Treas. Reg. § 1.166L6(b) (2) (2009). The $60,000 gain is computed by subtract-
ing from the amount realized, $160,000, the taxpayer's $100,000 basis in the property.
I.R.C. § 1001(a); KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 595.
II See Crane, 331 U.S. at 13-14. Crane v. Commissioner codified the treatment of nonre-
course debt as "true debt" or recourse debt. Id. at 11-14.
12
 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.11. A debt that the debtor is personally liable to repay is
known as a recourse debt. KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 601. Cancellation of indebted-
ness income is a creditor's discharge of a debtor's financial obligation for less than the full
amount that is due, consequently increasing the debtor's net worth. KAHN & KAHN, supra
note 7, at 43.
" See Tufts, 961 U.S. at 310 n.11; KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 601-02.
14 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.11; KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 601-02. Taxpayer's
gain is calculated by subtracting from the $110,000 fair market value of the property her
$100,000 basis in the property. See Tufts. 461 U.S. at 310 n.11; KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7,
at 601-02. COD income is calculated by subtracting from the $150,000 outstanding debt
the $110,000 fair market value of the property. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.11; KAHN &
KAHN, supra note 7, at 601-02.
15 See I.R.C. § 108(a) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. III 2009).
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the extent of the $10,000 gain. 16 Congress enacted § 108 to provide re-
lief for financially strapped debtors by temporarily relieving them of the
burden of taxation that would ordinarily be imposed on the cancella-
tion of debt. 17 The purpose of § 108 was to spread the immediate tax
burden from a cancellation of indebtedness over a subsequent period
in which the debtor has actual cash fiow. 18
Unfortunately, a borrower who is not personally liable for the debt
(nonrecourse debt) is precluded from taking advantage of § 108. 19 As-
suming the value of the property is still $110,000, the Service, upon
foreclosure, sale, or other disposition, collapses the two component
parts (gain and COD income) into a single disposition of property;
characterized only by gain. 29 Gain is computed by subtracting from the
amount realized—here equal to the full value of the outstanding
debt—the taxpayer's basis in the property. 21 Accordingly, the taxpayer
realizes a gain of $50,000. 22 Because taxpayers cannot use § 108 to defer
the recognition of gain, the taxpayer here must immediately pay tax on
the entire $50,000. 23
This Note argues that the Service's treatment of nonrecourse debt
and its application to § 108 is unworkable. 24 By allowing an insolvent
taxpayer to defer COD income, but not allowing an identical taxpayer
to defer gain from the discharge of indebtedness, the Service has disre-
16 See id.
17 See I.R.C. § 108(a); H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8-9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7017, 7024-25; KAHN & KAHN, =PM note 7, at 52.
I See H.R. REP, No. 96-833, at 8-9.
16 See Danenberg v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 370,384-86 (1979). A debt that the debtor has no
personal liability to repay and for which the creditor can collect, upon default, only by
foreclosing on the property securing the debt is known as nonrecourse debt. KAHN &
KAHN, supra note 7, at 600.
" See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 309-10 & n.11. For an explanation of the component parts, see
infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
21 1.ILC. § 1001(a) (2006); 7itfts, 461 U.S. at 309-10; KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 595.
I.R.C. § 1001(a); Tufts, 461 U.S. at 309-10. The taxpayer's gain is calculated by sub-
tracting from the $150,000 outstanding debt the $100,000 basis in the property. See 71tfts,
461 U.S. at 309-10.
26 See I.R.C. § 61 (a) (3) (2006); I.R.C. § 108(a) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. 1.11 2009);
Danenlierg, 73 T.C. at 384-86. Section 61(a) of the Code states that gross income includes
gains derived from dealings in property as well as income from discharge of indebtedness.
I.R.C. § 61(a). Section 108(a) of the Code provides an exception to the rule in § 61(a)
only for income from the discharge of indebtedness. I.R.C. § 108(a) (1). Section 108(a)
states that gross income does not include income by reason of the discharge of indebted-
ness where, among other things, the discharge occurs in a tide 11 proceeding or when the
taxpayer is insolvent. Id.
24 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 309-10 & n.11; H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8-9 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,7024-25.
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garded the statutory purpose of § 108 and has violated the fundamen-
tal principles of equity and fairness in the administration of our tax sys-
tem.26
Part I of this Note discusses the historical development of the Ser-
vice's treatment of nonrecourse debt, exploring the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1983 decision in Commissioner v. Tufts and its resolution of the
taxation of a transfer of property involving nonrecourse debt with a
value in excess of the collateral securing the debt.26 Part II examines
the impact of the Court's decision in Tufts and the resulting irregulari-
ties involving the Service's treatment of nonrecourse debt. 27 Part III
presents the codification of the Tufts approach along with the several
methods resourceful taxpayers have developed to avoid the realization
of income from a transfer of property with a fair market value less than
that of the nonrecourse debt securing it.28 Part IV delves into the statu-
tory history of § 108 and explores the policy behind allowing the defer-
ral of income from the discharge of indebtedness. 29 Ultimately, Part V
suggests that the Service's treatment of nonrecourse debt is unsound
and recommends that Congress amend § 108 to allow for the deferring
the recognition of gains from the discharge of indebtedness."
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW SURROUNDING TREATMENT OF
NONRECOURSE DEBT
In general, gross income does not include the receipt of borrowed
funds. 31 Section 61(a) of the Code defines gross income broadly as "all
income from whatever source derived." 32 The U.S. Supreme Court, in-
terpreting § 61(a), has held gross income to mean an accession to
wealth, clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has complete domin-
ion.33 A debtor does not realize an accession to wealth upon receipt of
25 Sec H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8-9; David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax
Theory, 24 YALE L. & PoCv REV. 43, 44-45 (2005).
26 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10.
" See Deborah A. Geier, Tufts and the Evolution of Debt-Discharge Theory, 1 FLA. TAX REV.
115, 162 (1992).
" See I.R.C. § 7701(g) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a), (c) (ex.7) (2008).
29 See H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8-9.
3° See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 309-10 & n.11; H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8-9. See infra note 227
for a definition of gain from the discharge of indebtedness.
51 See, e.g.. Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983); Milenbach v. Comm'r, 318 F.3d
924, 930 (9th Cir. 2003).
32 LR.C. § 61(a) (2006).
33 Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
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borrowed funds because the debtor's increase in assets is offset by a
corresponding liability to repay the borrowed amount. 34
Nevertheless, if a lender cancels a debt, relieving the borrower of
the duty to repay the loan, the liability ceases and the debtor realizes
income." Three theories support the taxation of a discharge of indebt-
edness: (1) the taxpayer's net worth has increased; (2) the earlier re-
ceipt of cash without realization of income must be offset; and (3) the
debtor would receive a tax-free return on investment if the discharged
debt was not taxed." In most cases, the Service taxes the discharge of
indebtedness as ordinary income under § 61(a) (12) of the Code."
The Service's treatment of discharged debt becomes more compli-
cated, however, where a borrower transfers or disposes of an asset in
recognition of an outstanding debt. 38
 Whenever a borrower transfers or
disposes of an asset, § 1001 of the Code determines the taxpayer's gain
or loss from the transaction." Unlike income from the discharge of
indebtedness, which enters gross income under § 61(a) (12), the Ser-
vice accounts for gains in gross income under § 61(a) (3) of the Code.°
The tax consequences of a gain can vary drastically from the treatment
of income from a cancellation of indebtedness.'" Principally, § 108 of
the Code may allow tax deferral of income from the cancellation of
indebtedness, whereas debtors cannot defer gains from dealings in
property under § 108. 42
 For this reason, the classification of income as
either cancellation of indebtedness or as a gain is critical in determin-
ing the nature of a debtor's tax liability. 43
In a transaction involving the sale or other disposition of property,
the categorization of income as either gain or cancellation of indebt-
edness primarily depends upon whether the borrower is personally li-
34
 See, e.g., Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307; Glenshaw, 384 U.S. at 431; Milenbach, 318 F.3d at 930.
" See United States v. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. 1,3 (1931).
3° See Kirby, 284 U.S. at 3; Fred T. Witt, Jr. & William H. Lyons, An Examination of the Tax
Consequences of Discharge of Indebtedness, 10 VA. TAX. REV. 1,6 (1990).
" I.R.C. § 61(a) (12) (defining gross income as all income from whatever source de-
rived, including, but not limited to, income from discharge of indebtedness).
3a See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 308-11.
' See 1.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006) (defining gain from the sale or other disposition of prop-
erty as the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis). The seller's total
receipts, or amount realized, include the value of any obligation of which the seller was re-
lieved through the transfer. See Crane v. Conun'r, 331 U.S. 1,11-14 (1947).
§ 61 (a)(3) (2006) (defining gross income as all income from whatever source
derived, including, but not limited to, gains derived from dealings in property).
41 See 1.R.C. § 108(a) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. III 2009); Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 &
n.11.
42 See I.R.C. § 108(a).
43 See id.; Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11.
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able for the debt and whether the value of the property is less than the
loan balance." A debt for which the debtor is personally liable to repay
is known as recourse debt. 45 Alternatively, a debt the debtor has no per-
sonal liability to repay is known as nonrecourse debt.° Generally, as
long as the property securing the obligation has a value equal to or in
excess of the liability, the Service treats recourse and nonrecourse debt
equally and it is of no consequence that the borrower is not personally
liable for the debt.47
 When the property's sale value exceeds the bor-
rower's debt obligation, the .borrower does not realize cancellation of
indebtedness income upon the sale or other disposition of the prop-
erty.48
 Thus, upon default of a debtor, the entire liability can be satisfied
through the sale of property securing the debt. 49 Accordingly, the en-
tire transaction is categorized as gain (or loss). 50
Differences arise in the Service's treatment of recourse and nonre-
course debt where a taxpayer transfers an asset with a fair market value
below that of the outstanding debt, in full recognition of the debt.51 In
this situation, a debtor holding property encumbered by a recourse
debt will realize part cancellation of indebtedness income and part gain
(or loss),52 A debtor who is insolvent or has filed for title 11 protection
may be able to defer the recognition of the cancellation of indebted-
ness income under § 108 of the Code."
The Service provides alternative rules for a debtor holding prop-
erty encumbered by nonrecourse debt." When a debtor transfers
property encumbered by nonrecourse debt and the amount of the en-
cumbrance is greater than the value of the property, the Service classi-
" See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11; Milner, supra note 6, at 161.
45 KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 601.
46 Id. at 600.
47 See Crane, 331 U.S. at 11-13; Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and Accrual: The Tax Treatment of
Non-recourse Debt, 44 TAX L, Rev. 401,409 (1989).
45 See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 595.
43 Id.
" See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006); KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 595. The taxpayer will
realize a gain if his basis is less than the fair market value of the property. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
Alternatively, a taxpayers will realize a loss if the basis is greater than the fair market value
of the property. Id.
51 See nfts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11.
H Id, at 310 n.11. The difference between the amount of the recourse debt out-
standing and the value of the property is treated as cancellation of indebtedness income
whereas the difference between the value of the property and the taxpayer's basis is
treated as gain (or loss). KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 601.
53 See I.R.C. § 108(a) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. III 2009).
54 Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10; KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 600-01.
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lies the entire transaction as gain (or loss).55
 Because § 108 does not
allow the taxpayer to defer the recognition of a gain, a financially
strapped debtor utilizing nonrecourse debt may be taxed dispropor-
tionately, and in excess of an identical taxpayer utilizing recourse
debt." The origins for this treatment of nonrecourse debt lie in the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Crane v. Commissioner. 57
A. Nonrecourse Debt as "True Debt": The Crane Doctrine
The 1947 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Crane v. Commissioner
established the treatment of nonrecourse debt as "true debt. "58
 Crane
was decided at a time before nonrecourse debt was widely used. 59 Prior
to this decision, a tremendous amount of uncertainty surrounded the
proper characterization of nonrecourse debt for federal income tax
purposes.° Some courts questioned whether nonrecourse debt should
be treated as "true debt" because the taxpayer is never under any per-
sonal obligation to pay the liability." Because the lender's sole recourse
is to the property securing the debt, the lender-mortgagee, rather than
the borrower-mortgagor, bears most of the risk of the value of the
property declining.°
Although nonrecourse debt may appear to disadvantage lenders,
banks have become more willing to provide such financing over the
years. 65
 One reason for the spread of nonrecourse financing is the
surge in real estate investment by limited partnerships combined with
the structure of the federal tax system." Under federal tax law, in order
for limited partners to obtain a depreciable basis in financed partner-
ship assets, the debt used to acquire such assets must be nonrecourie.°
Because the most common investment vehicle for commercial real es-
tate is the limited partnership, over time lenders have come to accom-
nitS, 461 U.S. at 307-10; KAIIN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 600-01.
56 See I.R.C. § 108(a); Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11.
57 See 331 U.S. 1, 11-13.
55 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307; Crane, 331 U.S. at 11-14.
59 Linda Sugin, Nonrecourse Debt Revisited, Restructured and Redefined, 51 TAX L. REV. 115,
118 (1995).
6°
 Diane M. Anderson, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COMM. L.
REV. 1498, 1498 (1982).
61 See Crane v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 585, 590 (1944), rev d, 153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd,
331 U.S. 1; Frederick H. Robinson, Nonrecourse Indebtedness, 11 VA. TAX REV. 1, 12 (1991).
62 See Robinson, supra note 61, at 4.
65 See James A. Fellows & Michael A. Yuhas, Nonrecourse Debt and Real Estate: The Issue of
Tax Basis, 26 REAL EST. L.J. 270, 271 (1998); Robinson, supra note 61, at 4.
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modate the investment community by providing the nonrecourse fi-
nancing these debtors demand.66
Beyond the tax benefits and limited liability nonrecourse financing
confers, the use of nonrecourse debt also has important advantages to
sellers of property.67
 Nonrecourse debt makes it easier for parties to
agree on loan terms, and sellers are often able to obtain better prices
than in a sale for cash or on a fully recourse basis. 63
 Purchasers may be
willing to take greater risk when utilizing nonrecourse debt because if
the value of the property or its earnings do not prove to be as high as
anticipated, purchasers can simply surrender the property without any
personal liability above their initial investment. 69
The Court's acceptance of the legitimacy of nonrecourse financing
in real estate transactions has also contributed to its attractiveness."
Although the Court's decision in Crane was not the first to consider the
treatment of nonrecourse indebtedness, 71
 the general principle that
nonrecourse debt is to be treated in the same fashion as recourse debt
for federal income tax purposes has come to be called the Crane doc-
trine.72
Crane concerned a taxpayer who had inherited an apartment
building subject to a nonrecourse mortgage equal to the property's fair
market value of $255,000. 73
 During the seven years Crane held the
building, she took a total of $25,500 in depreciation deductions,"
Crane subsequently sold the building to a third party, who paid Crane
$2,500 in cash and agreed to take the property subject to the $255,000
mortgage." Crane reported a capital gain 01'52,500 from the transac-
tion, which she computed by subtracting zero, her asserted basis in the
66 1d.
67 See id.
63 See id. Note, however, that the purchase price cannot exceed a demonstrably reason-
able estimate of the fair market value of the property. Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544
F.2d 1045,1048 (9th Cir. 1975). The test under Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner is whether
payments on the nonrecourse liability would produce equity in the property. Id. at 1049.
69 See Robinson, supra note 61, at 5.
7° See Crane, 331 U.S. at 14; Robinson, supra note 61, at 10.
71 See Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 682,688-89 (1943) (addressing the reali-
zation of gain upim the disposition of property encumbered by nonrecourse debt); Robin-
son, supra note 61, at 11.
73 See Crane, 331 U.S. at 11-14 (holding generally that nonrecourse debt is to be
treated the same as recourse debt for federal income tax purposes); Robinson, supra note
61, at 11.
73
 Crane, 331 U.S. at 3.
74
 Id. at 3 n.2.
75 Id. at 3-4.
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property, from the $2,500 net cash proceeds she received. 76 The Service
assessed a deficiency judgment of nearly $25,000, arguing that the full
amount of the nonrecourse debt should have been included in both
the taxpayer's basis and amount realized. 77
The Tax Court disagreed with the Service, holding that it would be
improper to include any portion of the nonrecourse mortgage liability
in the amount realized or basis. 78 With regard to amount realized, the
Tax Court reasoned that because Crane was never under any personal
obligation to pay the debt, she never received any benefit or considera-
tion by reason of her transfer of the property subject to the mortgage,
except for the $2,500 cash. 79 The Tax Court further concluded that be-
cause Crane had no equity in the property (as it was inherited), her
basis in the property was zero. 89
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, determining that Crane's basis
in the building was equal to the property's full value, undiminished by
the mortgage, less any depreciation deductions she had taken. 91 The
Court reasoned that if the taxpayer's equity were equal to basis, depre-
ciation deductions would represent only a fraction of the cost of the
corresponding physical exhaustion of the property. 62 This result is con-
trary to the Service's practice, which requires depreciation to be
charged off over the useful life of the property In addition, if depre-
ciation deductions were computed on the value of the property and
then deducted from an equity basis, the Service would have to accept
deductions from a negative basis, which is an unacceptable result. 84
Having decided the basis issue, the Court then turned to amount real-
ized, concluding that it includes both the cash Crane received from the
sale and the full value of the nonrecourse debt.° Although Crane was
not personally liable for the mortgage, the Court reasoned when a per-
son transfers property subject to a mortgage, the benefit to them is as
76 Tufts, 461 U.S. at 3-4.
77 Id. at 4.
78 See Crane, 3 T.C. at 590-91.
79 Id. at 590.
a) See id. at 591.
81 Crane, 331 U.S. at 6-11.
e2 Id. at 9-10.
to Id. at 9 n.27.
" Id. at 9-10.
66 Id. at 13-14 (determining that, although not personally liable, a debtor 'who sells
property subject to a mortgage and for additional consideration, realizes a benefit in the
amount of the mortgage as well as the boot"). Section 1001 defines "amount realized"
from the sale or other disposition of property as "the sum of any money received plus the
fair market value of the property (other than money) received." I.R.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
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real and substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a per-
sonal debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another. 56
Crane conclusively established that the value of a nonrecourse debt
is included both in the taxpayer's basis on acquisition and the amount
realized on disposition of a property.57 The Court noted, however, that
the analysis may differ in a situation where the value of the property is
less than the amount of the nonrecourse mortgage. 88
 Thus, the ques-
tion left unanswered by Crane was how to treat the disposition of debt-
encumbered property having a value less than the outstanding value of
the nonrecourse debt.89 Thirty-six years later, the U.S. Supreme Court
confronted this issue in Commissioner v. TiffIs. 90
B. Value of Nonrecourse Debt in Excess of Collateral: The Tufts Decision
The 1983 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Tufts resolved the long-
standing dispute concerning the calculation of amount realized from
the sale of property with a fair market value substantially less than the
amount of nonrecourse debt encumbering the property. 91
 The holding
established the modern rule that requires a taxpayer to include the full
amount of a nonrecourse note in both the amount realized and in basis
on the disposition of property, notwithstanding the fair market value of
the property92 In Tufts, the taxpayer acquired property in 1970 for
$1,851,500, and financed the transaction entirely with a nonrecourse
mortgage.93
 During the years 1971 and 1972, Tufts deducted a total of
$439,972 for depreciation, leaving him with an adjusted basis of
$1,455,740.94 Unfortunately, by August 1972, the value of the property
had fallen to $1,400,000. 95 Tufts subsequently transferred the property
to a buyer, who took the property subject to the nonrecourse mort-
gage.96 At the time of the sale, Tufts had not made any payments on the
$1,851,500 loan. 97
 On his federal income tax return, Tufts claimed a
loss of $55,740, which he computed by taking the difference between
86 Crane, 331 U.S. at 14.
87 Id. at 6-11,13-14.
BB Id. at 14 n.37.
89 Id.
90 See 461 U.S. at 307-10.
91 Id.; Crane, 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
" Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10.
93 Id. at 302.
14 Id.
93
 Id. at 303.
96 Id. at 302-03.
97 Id.
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the fair market value of the property and his adjusted basis. 98 Tufts ar-
gued that the economic benefit he received by being relieved of the
nonrecourse indebtedness was not the full amount of the liability, but
some lesser amount, which could not exceed the fair market value of
the property.99 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the "Commis-
sioner") disagreed and, on audit, determined that the sale resulted in a
capital gain of approximately $400,000. 100 The Commissioner's calcula-
tions proceeded on the theory that the amount realized must always
include the full amount of the nonrecourse obligation. 101 The question
raised to the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a taxpayer must include
the unpaid balance of a nonrecourse mortgage in the computation of
amount realized when the unpaid amount of the mortgage exceeds the
fair market value of the property sold. 3 °2
The Court held first that the taxpayer's basis includes the full
amount of the nonrecourse loan." This treatment, the Court rea-
soned, is consistent with Crane's holding that nonrecourse debt be
treated as a "true loan."'" When a taxpayer receives a loan, whether
recourse or nonrecourse, and applies the proceeds to the purchase
price of property used to secure the loan, that amount is included in
the taxpayer's basis. 109
In computing amount realized, the Tufts Court resolved the uncer-
tainty left by Crane and held that the amount realized upon the sale or
other disposition of property includes the outstanding amount of the
nonrecourse obligation, notwithstanding the fair market value of the
property. 106 The Court concluded that when a debtor sells or disposes
encumbered property to a purchaser who assumes the mortgage, the-
associated extinguishment of the obligation must be accounted for in
" Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303 & n.l. The difference between the fair market value of the
property on the date of transfer, $1,900,000, and Tufts' adjusted basis of $1,455,740 equals
the $55,790 toss Tufts claimed on the transfer. Id.
" See Conirn'r v. Tufts, 651 F.2d 1058, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 300. The
Fifth Circuit agreed with Tufts and held that the fair market value of the property securing
a nonrecourse debt limits the extent to which the debt can be included in the amount
realized on disposition of the property. Id. at 1063.
'°° Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303. The Commissioner determined Tufts' gain on the sale by
subtracting the adjusted basis of $1,455,740 from the $1,851,500 nonrecourse liability as-
sumed by the buyer. Id. at 303 n.2.
101 See id.; Crane, 331 U.S. at 13-14.
In Tufts, 961 U.S. at 301-02.
101 Id. at 307.
104 See id.; Crane, 331 U.S. at 11-19.
100 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307.
106 See id. at 309.
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the computation of amount realized. 107 The fact that a borrower is not
personally liable for the note does not erase the fact that he received
the loan proceeds tax-free and included them in his basis on the un-
derstanding that he had an obligation to repay the full amount)"
When the obligation is canceled, mortgagers are relieved of their re-
sponsibilities to repay the sum they originally received and thus realize
value to the extent of the relieved debt. 109 If the Court were to exclude
the full amount of the nonrecourse debt from amount realized, the
mortgagor would receive untaxed income at the time the loan was ex-
tended as well as an unwarranted increase in the basis of the prop-
erty. 110 Because the amount realized bears a functional relation to basis,
the Court concluded that any debt included in basis must be included
in the amount realized on disposition of the property"
Applying the holding to the facts of the case, the Court deter-
mined that upon transfer of the property, the taxpayer realized a gain
of $395,760, which is - the difference between the full $1,851,500 nonre-
course debt and Tufts' adjusted basis of $1,455,740.112
 The method
codified in Tufts is known as the "collapsed approach" because the Ser-
vice collapses. the two component parts of the transaction—the dis-
charge of debt and the disposition of the property—into one element,
analyzing the transaction as if it solely constituted a taxable sale of
property. 113
In the alternative, the Court could have, but chose not to, utilize
the two-step, or "bifurcated approach," to analyze the transaction. 114
107 Id. at 308-09.
108
 Id. at 312.
103 Id. Note, however, that the Court does not classify this debt as cancellation of in-
debtedness income. See id. Rather, the Court concluded that the relieved obligation consti-
tuted a benefit received by the taxpayer upon transfer of the property, the value of which
entered into the computation of amount realized under § 1001(b) of the Code. See id.;
I.R.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
110
 Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-09.
m See id.
112 See id. at 302-03, 317.
113 See id. at 307-10 & n.11. The discharge of debt is the difference between the
amount of the outstanding debt and the value of the property received in full recognition
of that debt: $451,500 ($1,851,500 — $1,400,000). See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 43.
Assuming the amount realized is equal to the fair market value of the property, the disposi-
tion produces a loss of $55,740, which is the difference between the fair market value of
$1,400,000 and the adjusted basis of $1,455,740. See id. at 595. The collapsed approach
combines these individual components into the computation of gain on the disposition.
Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11.
114 Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.11. Because the Court held that the collapsed approach was
a justifiable mode of analysis, the Court deferred to the Commissioner's judgment in
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Under the bifurcated approach, the transaction would be treated as two
separate components—a taxable disposition of property and a sepa-
rately taxable discharge of debt." The termination of the $1,851,500
obligation in consideration for the property worth $1,400,000 would
result in cancellation of indebtedness income of $451,500. 116 The dis-
position of the property would result in a capital loss of $55,740, repre-
senting the difference between the sale price of $1,400,000 and the ad-
justed basis of $1,455,740. 117 Although, the bifurcated approach is
utilized in identical situations involving recourse debt, the Court in
Tufts deferred to the Commissioner's judgment in employing the col-
lapsed approach. 119 The Court noted that even though the bifurcated
approach was justifiable, it was not the proper role of the Court to de-
cide which method was best. 119 Rather, it was the job of the Court to
decide whether the rule applied by the Commissioner was a reasonable
one. 120
The relatively quick dismissal of the bifurcated approach by the
U.S. Supreme Court is likely due to the fact that the federal income tax
consequences of the collapsed and bifurcated approaches are identical
under the facts of Tufis. 121 Utilizing the collapsed approach, Tufts real-
ized a taxable gain of $395,760.122 Similarly, under the bifurcated ap-
proach, Tufts realized gross income of $395,760.129 The two approaches
achieve far different results, however, when determining whether a
taxpayer may defer the recognition of such income. 124 Under § 108, a
taxpayer with COD income may be able to defer tax on such income,
while an identical taxpayer with gain does not qualify for deferral and
must immediately pay tax on the gain. 129 Thus, what appears to be a
relatively arbitrary decision to utilize the collapsed approach and clas-
choosing to utilize that approach. Id. The Court did note, however, that the bifurcated
approach could be an acceptable mode of analysis. Id.
" 5 Id.




129 Tufts, 461 U.S. at 302-03, 310 n.11; see also Geier, supra note 27, at 125.
' 2 ' See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.11, 317; Geier, supra note 27, at 127; supra notes 112-117
and accompanying text.
122 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10, 317.
123 Id. at 310 n.11. The $451,500 COD income is offset by the $55,740 capital loss, pro-
ducing net income of $395,760. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 287.
124 Seel.R.C. § 108(a) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. III 2009).
' 25 Id. If a debt is discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding or if the debtor is insolvent
when the discharge occurs, the amount discharged is excluded from gross income under
§ 108(a) (1). Id.
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sify the entire transaction as gain can have devastating effects on a tax-
payer who otherwise would have qualified under § 108 to defer the
recognition of COD income. 126 Although the Court considered the
overall income effect of the different approaches, it failed to scrutinize
the impact each approach would have on the classification of income as
either gain or COD and its interaction with § 108. 127
11. CONSEQUENCES OF HOLDING IN Turn
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner u Tufts to utilize
the collapsed approach and classify the transaction as gain has resulted
in several irregularities involving the treatment of nonrecourse debt. 128
The following principles and rules are largely a product of the interac-
tion of the Code with the holding in Tufts: first, COD income realized
under § 61(a) (12) may be deferred tinder § 108 by financially strapped
debtors, whereas no such deferral is available for gain realized under
§ 1001 and § 61(a) (3); 129
 second, the cancellation of nonrecourse debt
is treated differently depending upon whether the property securing
the debt is transferred or retained upon the discharge of debt; 13o and
third, the cancellation of recourse debt is treated differently than non-
recourse debt when the security transferred in satisfaction of the debt
has a value below the outstanding balance on the loan. 131
A. Section 108 Exception for COD Income
Section 108 creates an exception to the realization requirement of
gross income under § 61(a) for certain income from the discharge of
indebtedness.' 52
 To qualify for deferral under § 108, a taxpayer must
first realize discharge of indebtedness income.'" Section 108(a) (1) fur-
ther requires that, among other things, the discharge occur when the
126 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.11; Me also I.R.C. § 108(a).
127 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11; Geier, supra note 27, at 125.
126 See 461 U.S. 300, 307-10 & n.11 (1983); Geier, supra note 27, at 162.
126 See Danenberg v. Cotrun'r, 73 T.C. 370, 386 (1979); Geier, supra note 27, at 162.
19° See Gershkowitz v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 984, 988-90, 999-1000, 1016 (1987); Geier, su-
pra note 27, at 162.
too Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11; Geier, supra note 27, at 162.
132
 I.R.C. § 108(a) (1) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. III 2009).
133 Id. In order to realize income from the discharge of indebtedness, there must first
exist an item of indebtedness for which the taxpayer is liable subject to an unconditional
obligation to repay. See Milenbach v. Comm'r, 318 F.3d 924, 930 (9th Cir. 2003); Robert
Willens, The Elusive Notion of "Income from Discharge of Indthtedness," 18 J. BANKS. L. & PRAC.
1, art. 4. In general, the elimination or reduction of such indebtedness produces income
from discharge of indebtedness. See United States v. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
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taxpayer is in a title 11 bankruptcy proceeding, or is insolvent. 134 Sec-
tion 108 does not completely eliminate the taxation of income from the
discharge of indebtedness. 133
 Instead, it defers recognition until the
taxpayer is able to recover financially by reducing future tax benefits to
the extent of the income that was deferred under § 108(a) (1).' 38
Despite the fact that Congress enacted § 108 to allow financially
strapped debtors to defer the recognition of income from a discharge
of indebtedness, the rule does not apply to income or gain derived
from the sale or transfer of property in satisfaction of a debt, even if the
debtor is insolvent or bankrupt at the time of the discharge. 137 In the
1979 decision in Danenberg v. Commissioner; the Tax Court held that the
insolvency exception under § 108 did not relieve the taxpayer of the
requirement that he recognize a gain or loss on the disposition of
property. 138 Danenberg, the taxpayer, was insolvent when he sold vari-
ous items of property securing an outstanding loan to a third party and
arranged for the proceeds to be forwarded directly to the bank that
issued the loan. 139 After crediting the cash proceeds from the sale and
liquidating Danenberg's remaining collateral against the outstanding
debt, the bank forgave the remaining balance of the loan. 140 The court
concluded that Danenberg realized a gain on the sale of the property
amounting to the difference between the net proceeds paid to the
"4 1.R.C. § 108(a) (1). For the purposes of § 108, the term "insolvent" means the excess
of liabilities over the fair market value of assets. I.R.C. § 108(d). The term "tide 11 case"
means a case under title 11 of the United States Code (relating to bankruptcy), but only if
the taxpayer is under the jurisdiction of the court in such case and the discharge of in-
debtedness is granted by the court or is pursuant to a plan approved by the court. Id.
1 " I.R.C. § 108(b).
IN Id. In general, the amount excluded from gross income shall be applied to reduce
the following tax attributes in the following order: (1) net operating losses and carryovers;
(2) tax credits and carryovers; (3) capital loss carryovers; and (4) the basis of the taxpayers
assets. Id. Instead of reducing the foregoing factors, the taxpayer may elect to apply any
portion of the reduction to decrease the basis of depreciable property held by the tax-
payer. Id.
tsr LR.C. § 108(a); see Danenberg, 73 T.C. at 384-86; H.R. Rap. No. 96-833, at 8-9 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. 7017,7024-25. Gain or loss results whenever there is a sale or
other disposition of property. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006). For a discussion of the statutory his-
tory of § 108, see infra notes 214-219 and accompanying text.
193 73 T.C. at 384-86. The question of whether a transfer of property for the cancella-
tion of indebtedness is simply a sale rather than forgiveness of indebtedness is important
where the debtor is insolvent. Id. at 386. Insolvency would not eliminate the gain arising
from a sale of property, whereas a taxpayer's insolvency would eliminate income from the
cancellation of indebtedness under § 108. See id.
"9 Id. at 380-81.
113
 Id. at 376.
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bank on behalf of Danenberg and his basis in such property."' Because
there is no insolvency exception that precludes recognition of gain or
loss from the sale or other disposition of property, the court held that
Danenberg must inunediately pay tax on the gain realized from the
transfers. 142
 In regard to cancellation of indebtedness, the court deter-
mined that the remainder of the debt which was not satisfied through
the sale of property constituted COD income that did not have to be
recognized on account of Danenberg's insolvency. 143
Why did the Tax Court in Danenberg classify part of the taxpayer's
income as COD while the taxpayer in Tufts realized only non-deferrable
gain? 144 In Tufts, the sale of the property accompanied the discharge of
the non recourse obligation in excess of the fair market value of the
property. 145
 There, the Court applied the collapsed approach and char-
acterized the entire transaction as gain, which is not deferrable under
§ 108. 146 Yet, in Danenberg, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer's sale of
assets to a third party was completely separate from the bank's cancella-
tion of the remaining debt. 147
 Upon the sale of assets to the third party,
the court held that Danenberg realized a non-deferrable taxable gain. 148
Danenberg then applied the proceeds from the sale (cash) in consid-
eration for the bank's forgiveness of the remainder of the loan. 149 This,
the court held, resulted in COD income that did not have to be recog-
nized on account of Danenberg's insolvency.'" The only recognizable
difference between Tufts and Danenberg is that in Danenberg; instead of
transferring the bank property in consideration of the cancellation of
debt, Danenberg transferred the proceeds from the sale of property se-
curing the debt.'" Nevertheless, the discharged debt in Tufts was la-
beled gain whereas the discharged debt in Danenberg was labeled cancel-
lation of indebtedness, which is deferrable under § 108 . 152
141 Id. at 376.
142 Id. at 384-86.
148 Id. at 389.
144 see Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317; Danenberg, 73 T.C. at 389.
145 Tufts, 461 U.S. at 302-03,307-10.
14°1.R.C. § 108(a) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. III 2009); Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11.
147 73 T.C. at 384-86,388-89.
148 Id. at 376,384-86.
148 Id.
lk It at 388-89.
151 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 302-03; Danenberg, 73 T.C. at 380-81.
152 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317; Danenberg, 73 T.C. at 388-89.
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The impact and scope of the holding in Tufts is even broader when
applied to foreclosures or other involuntary "sales." 155 Long before its
decision in Tufts, the U.S. Supreme Court's 1941 decision in Helvering
Hammel established that foreclosures and other involuntary sales consti-
tute a sale or disposition of 'property under the predecessor to
§ 100L 154 In Helvering, the respondent argued that because a foreclo-
sure is beyond the control of the taxpayer, it cannot constitute a sale
under § 1001. 155
 The Court disagreed, and held that there was no basis
in the Act, its purpose, or its legislative history to treat sales differently
if they are forced and involuntary.' 56 A voluntary sale and a mortgage
foreclosure•are both dispositions under the meaning of § 1001. 157 In
1984, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Yarbro v. Commis-
sioner further extended the Helvering ruling to include abandonment of
property as a "sale or disposition."'" Holding otherwise, the court
noted, would allow taxpayers to manipulate the character of their gains
and losses and frustrate the purpose of § 1001. 155 Through these deci-
sions, courts have widened the scope of § 1001 and restricted a poverty-
stricken taxpayer's ability to defer income from a cancellation of in-
debtedness under § 108. 160
B. Security Retained Versus Transferred upon Debt Discharge
The cancellation of nonrecourse debt is treated differently de-
pending on whether the property securing the debt is transferred or
retained upon discharge of the debt.'" Where a taxpayer sells or dis-
poses of an asset upon the discharge of a debt, § 1001 applies and the
taxpayer may realize a non-deferrable gain from the transaction. 162 Al-
ternatively, because § 1001 is inapplicable where an asset is retained
upon the discharge of a debt, § 108 may allow a taxpayer to defer the
recognition of COD income generated by the transaction.'" The 1987
Tax Court decision, Gershkowitz v. Commissioner; decided four years after
155 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11; Helvering v Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11
(1941).
154 See Havering, 311 U.S. at 510-11.
155 Id. at 507.
156 Id. at 510.
157 1.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006); Helvering, 311 U.S. at 510.
158 See Helvering, 311 U.S. at 510; Yarbro v. Comm'r, 737 F.2d 479, 486 (5th Cir. 1984).
159 Yarbru, 737 F.2d at 486.
160 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317; Helvering, 311 U.S. at 510; Yar!nv, 737 F.2d at 486.
161 See Gershkowitz, 88 T.C. at 988-90, 999-1000, 1016.
162 LR.C. § 1001(a); see Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317.
183 See I.R.C. §§ 108(a) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp.1.11 2009), 1001(a) (2006).
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Tufts, demonstrated the impact of this rule.'" Gershkowitz, in much sim-
plified form, concerned the discharge of two nonrecourse loans by an
insolvent partnership known as Digitax. 165
 One loan involved a forgive-
ness of indebtedness without surrender of the securing property and
the other was a discharge of indebtedness upon surrendering the se-
curing property that, as in Tufts, had a fair market value that was less
than the extinguished debt. 166
 With regard to the first loan, the Tax
Court held that the discharge of the $250,000 nonrecourse debt for
$40,000 cash, without surrender of the securing property worth $2,500,
produced COD income of $210,000. 167 Even though the partnership
was insolvent, the court did not apply § 108 to allow it to defer recogni-
tion of COD income because none of the individual partners were in-
solvent. 168
 Nevertheless, it is significant that the individual partners
would have been able to defer the recognition of COD income had
they been insolvent. 169
With respect to the second nonrecourse loan, because the partner-
ship surrendered the security interest in satisfaction of the debt, the
transaction was treated as a sale arising under § 1001. 1 " The court,
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Tufts, held that
the amount realized included the entire amount of the indebtedness to
which the property was subject, including the portion in excess of the
property's fair market value."' Thus, the partnership was forced to rec-
ognize gain to the extent that the outstanding indebtedness exceeded
the partnership's adjusted basis in the re-conveyed property. 172
 Because
the entire transaction was classified as gain, the partnership did not re-
alize any COD income with respect to the second nonrecourse loan
and the insolvency exception under § 108 was unavailable. 175
164 Gershkowitz, 88 T.C. at 984, 1005-06, 1015-16.
166 Id. at 988-90, 999-1000.
166 Id. at 1005-06, 1015-16.
167 1d. at 1004-14.
1" See id. at 1009.
169
 See id. Had the discharge of indebtedness occurred.while the taxpayers were insol-
vent or in a title 11 proceeding, § 108 would have applied to defer the recognition of the
$210,000 of COD income. See I.R.C. § 108(a) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. III 2009); Gershko-
witz, 88 T.C. at 1009.
17° Gerslthowitz, 88 TC. at 1016.
171 a
172 Id. Gain under the analysis in Tufts is calculated by taking the difference between
the outstanding amount of the nonrecourse note and the taxpayer's basis in the property.
Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10.
1 " Gerslthowitz, 88 T.C. at 1016.
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The Service codified the holding in Gershkowitz in Revenue Ruling
91-31, which looked at the effect of a reduction in the principal amount
of an under-secured nonrecourse debt. 174 The facts of the ruling con-
cerned a debtor who, in 1988, borrowed $1,000,000 on a nonrecourse
basis from a creditor. 176 The debtor had no personal liability with re-
spect to the note, which was secured by an office building the debtor
acquired for $1,000,000. 176 Subsequently, the value of the office build-
ing fell to $800,000 and none of the $1,000,000 outstanding principal
had been paid off when the creditor agreed to modify the terms of the
note, reducing its principal amount to $800,000) 77 In its ruling, the
Service determined that the debtor realized $200,000 in COD in-
come. 178 Citing Gershkowitz, the Service reasoned that when a taxpayer
is discharged from all or a portion of a nonrecourse liability with no
disposition of the collateral, COD income is realized. 176 An identical
taxpayer who is unable to restructure his or her debt, however, is likely
to face foreclosure by the bank. 1110 In such a case, the taxpayer is sad-
dled with the double burden of losing his or her property along with a
non-deferrable gain upon the transfer.'8'
C. Cancellation of Recourse Versus Nonrecourse Debt
The cancellation of recourse debt is treated differently than non-
recourse debt when the security transferred in satisfaction of the debt
has a value below the outstanding balance on the loan. 162 As illustrated'
in Tufts, the transfer of collateral in satisfaction of a nonrecourse debt
generates a gain for the taxpayer where the value of the collateral is less
than the balance of the debt owed. 183 In the case of recourse debt,
however, the transfer of property to satisfy or discharge a debt will be
treated in part as a cancellation of indebtedness, to which § 108 may
174 Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-1 C.B. 19. A nonrecourse debt becomes under-secured when
the property securing the debt has a fair market value below the outstanding amount of






193 See Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-1 C.B. 19.
'a' See id. Because foreclosure constitutes a "sale or other disposition" under § 1001,
the taxpayer will realize gain under Tufts analysis of the difference between the full value
of the nonrecourse note and the taxpayer's basis in the property. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-
10; Hclvering, 311 U.S. at 510.
lea 710, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11.
laa Id. at 307-10.
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apply, and in part as a sale tinder § 1001.' 84 This distinction represents
the difference between the collapsed and bifurcated approaches. 185
The 1979 Tax Court decision in Estate of Delman v. Commissioner
demonstrated the treatment of nonrecourse debt upon foreclosure
under the Tufts analysis.'" In Delman, an insolvent taxpayer transferred
property with a fair market value of $400,000 and an adjusted basis of
$500,000 to a creditor in foreclosure of a $1,200,000 nonrecourse
loan. 187 The Tax Court held that repossession of the property by the
lender constituted a sale or other disposition under § 1001.' 88
 Because
the taxpayer utilized nonrecourse debt, the entire transaction was char-
acterized as gain, equal to the difference between the outstanding
amount of the nonrecourse loan and the taxpayer's adjusted basis in
the property. 189 Although insolvent, the taxpayer was not able to defer
the recognition of the gain because § 108 only allows the deferral of
COD income.'"
Had the debt been recourse, the result of this case would have
been much different. 191 With recourse debt, the Service bifurcates the
transaction into a taxable disposition of property and a separate dispo-
sition of debt. 192 The taxpayer's amount realized upon disposition of
the property would be limited to the property's fair market value of
$400,000. 1" The taxpayer's adjusted basis of $500,000 would then be
subtracted from the amount realized to produce a deductible loss un-
der § 1001 of $100,000. 1 " The taxpayer would also realize $800,000 of
COD income, which is the difference between the outstanding debt of
$1,200,000 and the fair market value of the property transferred in sat-
184 Id. at 310 n.11.
188 See id. at 307-10 & n. 11. For a discussion of the distinction between the collapsed
and bifurcated approaches, see supra notes 106-117 and accompanying text.
188 See 73 T.C. 15, 33 (1979). Although Delman was decided before the U.S. Supreme
Court came down with its decision in Tufts, the Tax Court presided over the original Tufts
litigation and held that the amount realized upon the disposition of property included the
balance due on a nonrecourse liability, even if it exceeded the fair market value of the
property. Tufts v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 756, 763-66 (1978).
187 See Delman, 73 T.C. at 27-28.
188 See id. at 33.
189 See id. The taxpayer realized a gain of $700,000 upon foreclosure, representing the
difference between the $1,200,000 nonrecourse debt and his adjusted basis of $500,000. Id.
199 Id. at 33, 37-40.
191 See 71tfts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (2), (c) (ex. 8) (2008).
192 See Tufts, 461 U.S, at 307-10 & n.11; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (2), (c) (ex. 8).
193 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11; Delman, 73 T.C. at 27-28; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-
2(a) (2), (c) (ex. 8).
194 SeeI.R.C. § 1001 (2006); Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.l 1; Delman, 73 T.C. at 27-28.
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isfaction of the debt. 196
 The COD income would be deferrable here
because the debtor falls under the insolvency exception to § 108. 196
III. CODIFICATION OF TUFTS AND AVOIDANCE BY TAXPAYERS
Despite the idiosyncrasies produced by the interaction of the Code
with the holding in Commissioner v. Tufts, the analysis in Tufts has been
codified through several statutory provisions.'" As part of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1984, § 7701(g) of the Code provides that for the purposes
of determining the amount of gain or loss with respect to any property;
the fair market value of such property shall be treated as being not less
than the amount of any nonrecourse indebtedness to which the prop-
erty is subject. 198
 Similarly, Treasury Regulations §§ 1.1001-2(a) and
1.1001-2 (c) (ex. 7) require that upon sale or other disposition of prop-
erty securing a nonrecourse debt, the amount realized from the sale or
exchange shall equal the face amount of the nonrecourse debt without
regard to the underlying fair market value of the property securing the
debt.' 99
 Thus, §§ 7701 (b) and 1.1001-2 have effectively closed the door
to any argument that the bifurcated approach should apply in a Tufts
scenario.200
Nevertheless, because of the incongruous treatment of nonre-
course debt in a Tufts scenario, resourceful taxpayers and lawyers have
crafted several ways in which an insolvent taxpayer might avoid realiza-
tion of income from a transfer of property with a fair market value less
than that of the nourecourse debt securing it. 201 One technique is to
convert the nonrecourse debt into recourse debt prior to the disposi-
tion of collateral and then transfer the property to the original seller in
satisfaction of the debt. 402 Because the transaction involves recourse
195 See LIU. § 108(a) (1) (B) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. III 2009); Tap, 461 U.S. at 310
& n.11; Delman, 73 T.C. at 27-28; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(c) (ex.8).
nos I.R.C. § 108(a) (1) (B).
197 1.R.C. § 7701(g) (2006); Treas. Reg. § L1001-2(a), (c) (ex.7) (2008).
199 I.R.C. § 7701(g). There is no mention of any difference in treatment when fair
market value of the property securing the note falls below the outstanding value of the
nonrecourse debt. See id.
199 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a), (c) (ex.7).
21:10 see e.g., Geier, supra note 27, at 144-62; Milner, supra note 6, at 175-76. A "TVs
scenario" occurs when the lair market value of property held by the taxpayer falls below
the value of the outstanding nonrecourse debt securing such property. See Comm'r v.
Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 302-03 (1983).
wi See Witt & Lyons, supra note 36, at 61.
202 Id.
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debt, a court would apply the bifurcated approach and any resulting
COD income would be deferrable under § 108.205
A second approach is to sell the collateral to a third party with the
lender's consent and use the proceeds to satisfy the nonrecourse debt. 204
This is the same approach utilized by the taxpayer in Danenberg u Com-
missioner.205 The sale of the property securing the nonrecourse debt to a
third party would produce a taxable gain (or loss) under § 1001 and the
payment of the proceeds to satisfy the debt would result in COD in-
come, which is deferrable tinder the insolvency exception of § 108, 206
The third method involves negotiating a discharge of the nonre-
course debt down to the fair market value of the property by making a
partial payment, and subsequently transferring the property to the
original lender in satisfaction of the remaining debt. 207 The partial
payment would produce deductible COD income to the extent of the
debt discharged. 208 After the cancellation of debt, the fair market value
of the property should equal the value of the outstanding debt. 209 Now,
upon sale or other disposition of the property; the amount realized
would be equal to the fair market value of the property and the tax-
payer's gain (or loss) on the transfer would be equal to the difference
between the fair market value of the property and the taxpayer's ad-
justed basis in the property. 210 This result is identical to the Service's
treatment of recourse debt under the bifurcated approach where the
lender discharges the value of the outstanding debt that exceeds the
fair market value of the property securing the debt. 2"
In each example, by creatively structuring transactions to avoid the
disparate treatment of nonrecourse debt, taxpayers are able to utilize
the nonrecognition benefits of § 108 while avoiding the classification of
2" See I.R.C. § 108(a) (1) (II) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. III 2009); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-
2(a) (2), (c) (ex. 8).
2" Witt & Lyons, supra note 36, at 61.
205 T.C. 370, 376, 380-81, (1979); see supra notes 138-143 and accompanying text.
206
 I.R.C. §§ 108(a) (1) (B), 1001(a) (2006); Danenberg v. Conun'r, 73 T.C. 370.380-81,
389 (1979). Under the stipulated facts, because the fair market value of the security is less
than the outstanding nonrecourse debt, the proceeds from the sale of the property would
be insufficient to satisfy the full debt. See Danenberg, 73 T.C. at 376. Thus, if the creditor
agrees to accept the proceeds in full satisfaction of the remaining debt, the taxpayer real-
izes COD income to the extent the debt exceeds the proceeds from the sale. Id. at 389.
207 Witt & Lyons, supm note 36, at 61.
20a See I.R.C. § 61 (a) (12) (2006); I.R.C. § 108(a) (1) (B).
2" See Witt & Lyons, supra note 36, at 61. The purpose of the negotiations with the
bank was to reduce the outstanding amount of debt to the fair market value of the prop-
erty. Id.
210 I.R.C. § 1001 (a)-(b) (2006).
211
 Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11.
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the entire transaction as § 1001 gain.212 Looking to the statutory history
of § 108, these tactics arguably create a result that is more in line with
the purpose of § 108. 213
IV. STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF § 108
Congress enacted § 108 of the Code to benefit financially troubled
taxpayers by providing temporary relief from the recognition of dis-
charged debt.214
 Adopted in 1954, § 108 substantially extended the
availability of relief from income arising front the discharge of indebt-
edness. 213 Income from the cancellation of indebtedness is unique in
that nothing is actually received at the time the liability is incurred. 216
Long before the statutory exception for COD income had been codi-
fied in § 108, Congress took note of the fact that taxation of income
from the cancellation of indebtedness was particularly burdensome in
that it might be incurred long after the initial transaction that provided
the taxpayer with funds. 217 There was much concern that it was unjust
to impose a large tax upon the theoretical profit resulting from the
modification or liquidation of the indebtedness of the debtor. 218 Be-
cause the taxable event does not produce cash for the tax payment,
Congress reasoned that it made little sense to force an insolvent or
bankrupt debtor to immediately pay tax on the amounts the debtor
had been unable to pay his creditors. 219
Thus, § 108 was intended to allow Congress to defer, but eventually
collect tax on, ordinary income realized from the discharge of indebt-
edness.220 Under the statute, a taxpayer who is insolvent or in a title 11
proceeding will not immediately pay tax on income from a discharge of
212 See L RC. §§ 108(a) (1) (B), 1001; Witt & Lyons, supra note 36, at 61.
215 See H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8-9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7024-25.
214 see id.
215 Estate of Delman v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 15, 39 n.19 (1979). Prior to 1954, §§ 22(b) (9)
and 113(b) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 permitted corporations in unsound
financial condition to exclude from income a gain resulting from the discharge of indebted-
ness evidenced by a security. H.R. REP. No. 76-855, at 23-25 (1939). Individuals were not able
to exclude income from the discharge of indebtedness under §§ 22(b) (9) or 113(b) (3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Id.
218 William T. Plumb, Jr., The Tax Recommendation.; of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws—Reorganizations, Carryovers and the Effects of Debt Reduction, 29 TAX L. Rev. 227, 255
(1974).
217 Norris Darrell, Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax, 53 HARV. L. Rev.
977, 977-78 (1940).
218 Plumb, supra note 216, at 260.
219 See id. at 277.
220 H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8-9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7024-25.
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indebtedness. 22 i Instead, the amount of discharged debt which is ex-
cluded from gross income is applied to reduce certain tax attributes
specified in § 108(b) . 222 The attribute-reduction provisions of the stat-
ute give flexibility to the debtor to account for a debt discharge amount
in a manlier most favorable to the debtor's tax situation. 223
The deferral rules of § 108 apply with respect to discharge of any
indebtedness for which the taxpayer is liable or arising from property
the taxpayer holds. 224 The legislative history and the statutory language
of the act provide no additional explanation about what constitutes
"indebtedness of the taxpayer."225 Nevertheless, as interpreted over the
years, the words Indebtedness . . . subject to which the taxpayer holds
property" have been understood to mean nonrecourse debt. 226 One
might have deciphered from this interpretation an intent to include
gain attributed to the discharge of indebtedness under § 108.227 Yet, in
spite of this option, subsequent decisions by the Service and the Court
have limited the scope of § 108 and precluded gain from the discharge
of indebtedness. 228 This relatively arbitrary determination conflicts with
221 Id. at 9. For a definition of "insolvent" and "title 11 case" as it applies to § 108, see
supra note 134. A debtor is allowed to defer taxation of COD income up to the amount he
or she is insolvent. I.R.C. § 108(d) (West Supp. 2008 & Supp. III 2009). Any COD income
that exceeds the insolvency of the debtor is taxed as ordinary income. See it
222
 I.R.C. § 108(b). Unless the taxpayer elects first to reduce the basis of depreciable
assets, the debt discharge amount is applied to reduce the taxpayer's tax attributes in the
following order: (1) net operating losses and carryovers; (2) tax credits and carryovers; (3)
capital loss carryovers; and (4) the basis of the taxpayer's assets. Id. Where the taxpayer
elects to reduce the basis of depreciable assets instead of reducing future tax attributes, a
subsequent disposition of the reduced-basis property will be subject to "recapture" in order
to ensure that the debt discharged amount is eventually taxed as ordinary income. See H.R.
REP. No. 96833, at 8. Section 1245 of the Code governs recapture and ensures that, upon
disposition, the amount of gain attributable to depreciation or a reduction in basis is taxed
as ordinary income and not capital gain. I.R.C. § 1245(a) (2006).
223 H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8.
rt4 I.R.C. § 108(d) (1).
223 Id.; see S. REP. No. 96-1035 (1980).
226 See Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947); see also Witt & Lyons, supra note 36, at
44 n.190. A basic tenet of statutory construction is that statutory language should be as-
cribed its plain and ordinary meaning. See Old Colony R.R. Co, v. Comm'r, 284 U.S. 552,
560 (1931); see also Witt & Lyons, supra note 36, at 44 n.190.
222 See Crane, 331 U.S. at 14. Gain attributed to the discharge of indebtedness, or "Tufts
gain," is the difference between the outstanding amount of nonrecourse debt and the fair
market value of the property securing the debt. See Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307-10
& n.11 (1983). Tuftsgain is equal to the amount of COD income produced from an identi-
cal transaction involving recourse debt. Id.; see supra notes 114-118 and accompanying
text.
228 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a), (c) (ex.7) (2008).
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the original objective of § 108, which is to provide relief for financially
troubled debtors. 226
The purpose of deferral under § 108 was to spread the immediate
tax burden from a discharge of indebtedness over a subsequent period
in which the debtor has actual cash flow.250 It was intended to provide a
"fresh start" for insolvent or bankrupt debtors. 251 Congress justified this
leniency because of the belief it would help preserve a business enter-
prise's ability to be economically productive. 252 Accordingly, the finan-
cial burden on the government was thought to be minimal as greater
tax revenues were anticipated from the sustenance and economic pros-
perity of individuals and corporations. 235 Nor was deferral of COD in-
come under § 108 thought to be unfair to creditors because in a simple
insolvency or bankruptcy case, the creditors receive nothing once their
claims have been canceled or discharged. 2M Instead, the rules of the
statute allow for debtors to recover from their financial difficulties while
preserving the congressional intent of collecting, within a reasonable
period, tax on the ordinary income realized from debt discharge. 255
V. SECTION 108 AND THE INCLUSION OF TUFTS GAIN
No rational explanation can be advanced as to why gain attribut-
able to a discharge of indebtedness is not covered under § 108. 236 In
light of the consequences of Commissioner v. Tufts, the structures taxpay-
ers have utilized to exploit this disparity, and the statutory history of
§ 108, it is apparent that a deficiency exists in the treatment of nonre-
course debt cancellation that needs to be corrected. 237
229 See H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8-9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7024-
25. For example, a bankrupt or insolvent debtor who wishes to retain net operating losses
and other carryovers will be able to elect to reduce asset basis in depreciable property. Id.
at 9. On the other hand, a debtor having an expiring net operating loss which otherwise
would be 'wasted" can apply the debt discharge amount first against the net operating loss.
Id.
2!0
	 supra note 216, at 277.
231 See H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 9.
222 H.R. REP. No. 75-1409 (1937).
233 See Id.
234 Plumb, supra note 216, at 278.
235 See H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 9 (1980).
2" See Tufts v. Comm'r, 461 U.S. 300, 307-10 & n.11 (1983); H.R REP. No. 96-833, at 8-
9 (1980); Plumb, supra note 216, at 260, 277. For a definition of "gain attributed to the
discharge of indebtedness," see supra note 227.
2" See Gershkowitz v Comm'r, 88 T.C. 984, 988-90, 999-1000, 1016 (1987); Danenberg
v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 370, 386 (1979); Estate of Delman v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 15, 37-40 (1979).
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A. No Rational Explanation far § 108 Exclusion of Gain Attributed to a
Discharge of Indebtedness
The Service currently applies a different analysis depending on
whether the property securing the nonrecourse debt is transferred or
retained upon the discharge of debt. 238 Where an asset is retained upon
the discharge of debt, § 108 may apply to defer the recognition of COD
income.238 On the other hand, if the taxpayer sells or otherwise dis-
poses of the asset, § 108 is inapplicable and the taxpayer recognizes
gain (or loss) from the transaction.m Because the only difference be-
tween these two scenarios is the conveyance of the property, the act of
transferring property must somehow hold the key to the Service's
treatment of gain attributable to the discharge of indebtedness."'
Where property is transferred, § 1001 governs in order to determine
the gain or loss from the transaction.242
 Because the debtor is not per-
sOnally liable for the nonrecourse note, any debt forgiven is done so
involuntarily on the part of the creditor. 243 Where the property is re-
tained, any discharge of indebtedness is voluntary and the result of ne-
gotiations between the debtor and creditor, 244
There is no rational explanation for why the voluntariness of a
creditor's actions in foregoing the collection of a deficiency should
have an impact on how the transaction is taxed. 245
 Both transactions are
indistinguishable, whether viewed from the side of the debtor or the
creditor. 248 In each situation, the debtor is taxed simply because of the
failure to repay the amount previously received from the lender tax-free
and subject to the obligation of repayment. 247
 From the creditor's per-
spective, it is irrelevant whether the discharge was voluntary or involun-
tary because the amount of debt discharged in each transaction is iden-
tical. 248
 It follows that whether the discharge was voluntary (the fact
that the security was retained) should have no impact on how the
debtor is taxed. 249
228 Gershkowitz, 88 T.C. at 988-90,999-1000,1016.
2" Id. at 1004-14.
248 Id. at 1016.
241 See Geier, supra note 27, at 171-72.
242 I.R.C. § 1001 (a) (2006).
241 KAHN & KAHN, supra note 7, at 602-03.
244 Id.





 Sec Gershkowitz, 88 T.C. at 988-90, 999-1000, 1016; Geier, supra note 27, at 172.
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Nor can § 108's exclusion of gain from the discharge of indebted-
ness be justified due to the distinction between recourse and nonre-
course debt. 25° The Service taxes the cancellation of recourse debt dif-
ferently than nonrecourse debt where the security transferred has a
value below the outstanding balance on the loan. 251 This practice is a
violation of the very principles established in Crane v. Commissioner,
which laid the foundation for the treatment of nonrecourse debt as a
"true loan."252
 As the Court observed in Tufts, the only difference be-
tween a nonrecourse debt and one for which the borrower is personally
liable is that with nonrecourse debt, the creditor's remedy is limited to
foreclosing on the securing property. 255 This merely shifts the risk of
any potential loss caused by devaluation of the property from the bor-
rower to the lender. 254
 The use of nonrecourse debt has no effect on
the nature of the debtor's obligation and does not erase the fact that
the debtor received the loan proceeds tax-free and included them in
basis on the understanding that there was an unconditional obligation
to repay the full amount. 255 When a debt is canceled, the debtor is re-
lieved of his or her responsibility to repay the sum originally received
and thus realizes value to the extent of the canceled debt. 256 Neverthe-
less, with nonrecourse debt, the canceled amount is included in the
amount realized on disposition and enters into the computation of the
debtor's gain (or loss) on the transaction.257 With recourse debt, a dis-
charge of indebtedness produces COD income, which may be deferred
under § 108. 258
Whether deliberate or unintentional, the Tufts ruling created a
substantial divergence in how § 108 applied to different debt discharge
scenarios involving recourse and nonrecourse debt. 258 Yet, as the Court
in Tufts noted, not only is the nature of the obligation the same as be-
tween recourse and nonrecourse debt, the rationalization for taxing a
discharged obligation is the same as wells° Adhering to the Court's
reasoning that recourse and nonrecourse debt be treated equally, gain
259 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11.
251 Id.
252 See Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1,11-13 (1947).
253 461 U.S. at 311-12.
254
 Id. at 312.
155 Id.
256 United States v. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. 1,3 (1931).
257 Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10.
259 a at 310 n.11.
259 See id. at 307-10 & n.11.
2'1° See id. at 311-12.
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attributed to the discharge of indebtedness should be deferrable tinder
§ 108 for nonrecourse as well as recourse debt. 261
B. Statutory and Equitable Support for Amendment of § 108
The statutory history of § 108 provides additional support for the
conclusion that gain attributed to the discharge of indebtedness should
be covered under § 108. 262 Congress enacted § 108 to allow insolvent or
bankrupt debtors to defer the immediate recognition of discharged
debt. 263 Congress believed that the imposition of a large tax upon the
theoretical profit resulting from the modification or liquidation of a
debt was unjust and contrary to the policy of promoting successful
business enterprises. 264 Nevertheless, by excluding gain from the dis-
charge of indebtedness from § 108, Congress is ignoring the very poli-
cies that form the backbone of the rule. 265 Gain from the discharge of
indebtedness is identical to COD income in that it produces no cash
for the payment of the tax liability.266 Thus, as is the case with COD in-
come, it is illogical for the Service to tax an insolvent or bankrupt tax-
payer on the discharged amounts he or she had been unable to pay his
or her creditors.267 Rather, deferring the gain under § 108 and taxing it
over a subsequent period in which the taxpayer has cash flow is a more
reasonable ap. proach. 268
The fundamental goals of equity and fairness in the administration
of the tax system provide additional justifications for the inclusion of a
Tufts gain under § 108. 269 Horizontal equity is the principle that simi-
larly situated taxpayers should face similar tax burdens. 27° In many re-
spects, horizontal equity is a fundamental criterion of a "good tax" and
its violation, while not fatal, indicates that tax burdens are not fairly dis-
tributed.271
In applying the horizontal equity principle, income is a common
measure used to group "similarly situated" taxpayers. 272 Thus, two insol-
261 Id.
282 See H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8-9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,7024-25.
2°3 Id.
284





268 See id. at 260.
26° See Elkins, supra note 25, at 43.
2'7° Id. at 43.
271 Id. at 43-44.
272 See id. at 44-45.
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vent taxpayers, one with COD income and one with gain from the dis-
position of indebtedness, are similarly situated if they have similar in-
comes. 273 It is irrelevaut whether the borrower is personally liable for
the debt or whether the property is transferred upon disposition of the
debt. 274 By allowing the insolvent taxpayer to defer COD income while
not allowing the identical taxpayer to defer gain from the discharge of
indebtedness, horizontal equity is violated. 275 Theories of social justice
and morality require equity in our legislative and judicial system. 276 It is
apparent, however, that § 108 is seriously flawed in this regard. 277 In the
interests of complying with the purpose of § 108 as well as equity prin-
ciples, Congress must amend § 108 to include gain from the disposition
of in debtedn ess.278
C. Economic Justifications for Inclusion of Gain from the Discharge of
Indebtedness in § 108
Given the worsening economic environment, it is unsound from
an economic policy standpoint to preclude gain from the disposition of
indebtedness from the reach of § 108. 279 Tumbling real estate values
combined with the record number of foreclosures mean that many
more debtors will realize Tufts gains.280 Taxing these gains is irresponsi-
ble in a financial crisis of this magnitude as it saddles struggling taxpay-
ers with additional debt they cannot afford to pay. 281 This further per-
petuates the financial collapse and puts additional pressure on the real
estate market and banks. 282 Consider, for example, the tax implications
of Deutsche Bank's attempts to foreclose on the $482 million loaned to
278 See id
274 see id.
278 See Elkins, supra note 25, at 49-45.
278 Id.
277 See id.
2" See id, at 44-45; Plumb, supra note 216, at 260.
279 See H.R. REP. No. 75-1409 (1937); Milner, supra note 6, at 161; Christie, supra note 1.
For an interesting discussion of the economic incentives of the federal income tax system
generally, compare Martini. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L.
Ray. 993 (2004) (arguing that an economic benefit would result from reducing income ine-
quality through the tax system), with Richard Schmalbeck, The Death of the Efficiency-Equity
Tradeoff?: A Commentary on McMahon's The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L.
Rey. 1 143 (2004) (suggesting that only moderate rate adjustments would be desirable).
288 Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317; Milner, supra note 6, at 161.
28' See Plumb, supra note 216, at 260.
282 See Christie, supra note 1.
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develop the Drake Hotel site in New York City. 285
 Harry Macklowe
bought the Drake in 2006 for $418 million using money borrowed from
Deutsche Bank.284
 For detnonstration purposes, assume that the fair
market value of the property has fallen to $300 million and that Mack-
lowe has a basis of $250 million in the property. Under the Tufts analy-
sis, Macklowe would realize a non-deferrable gain of $232 million. 285
Currently, Macklowe is experiencing significant financial difficulties
and is in default on several other loans totaling well over $1 billion. 288
Requiring Macklowe to immediately pay tax on a $232 million gain will
do nothing but push him further into economic arrears with his credi-
tors by depriving them of this additional cash. 287
 This, in turn, puts
added strain on the banks that provided the financing to Macklowe to
purchase these properties.288 Thus, by taxing Macklowe's gain on the
disposition of indebtedness, the Service is essentially hurting the very
financial institutions that are presendy near collapse and have been
forced to turn to the government for aid.288 Applying § 108 to defer this
immediate tax payment over a subsequent period where the debtor has
actual cash flow is a sensible step for Congress to take. 290
CONCLUSION
The disparate treatment of nonrecourse debt in situations involv-
ing the transfer of property worth less than the debt, in full satisfaction
of the debt, has no justification. The U.S. Supreme Court in Commis-
sioner v. Tufts was correct in concluding that the full amount of a non-
recourse debt should be included in the amount realized on sale, not-
withstanding the fair market value of the debt. Nevertheless, the Court





 Adam Pincus, Macklowe Claims $250M Personal Equity in the Drake Site THE REAL
DEAL, Mar. 18, 2009, http://ny.therealdeal.com/articles/macklowe-claims-250m-personal-
equity-in-drake-site (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
288 See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 & n.11. Macklowe's gain is computed by taking the differ-
ence between $482 million, the full amount of the outstanding loan, and $250 million,
Macklowe's adjusted basis in the property. See id.
286 See David M. Levitt, Maritime May Lose $500 Million Site on Park Ave, litoost RERG.COM ,
Sept, 11, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/appsinews?pid=20601206&sid=aRGcQNDVm




29° See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-10 & n.11; H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 8-9 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7024-25; Plumb, supra note 216, at 260; Christie, supra note 1.
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failed to consider the impact this conclusion would have on the ability
of a financially troubled debtor to defer COD income under § 108. The
statutory history of § 108 demonstrates that the policy reasons for al-
lowing the deferral of COD income directly apply and implicitly au-
thorize § 108 to cover gain from the cancellation of indebtedness. The
overriding principles of equity and fairness in the administration of our
tax system lend additional support for this conclusion. Given the cur-
rent economic environment, the need for such a change has never
been more relevant or pressing.
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